Disclosure standards of Chinese companies: a comparative study of companies with both A and H shares Listings. by Lee, Pui-Wah Josephine. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Business Administration.
The Chinese University ofHongKong holds the copyright of this project 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Business Administration. Any person or persons intending 
to use a part or whole of the materials in this project in a proposed 
publication must seek copyright release from the Dean of the Graduate 
School. 
DISCLOSURE STANDARDS OF CfflNESE COMPANIES : 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMPANIES WITH BOTH A AND H SHARES 
LISTINGS : \ 
y‘' . . . " , . _ „ _ • < - . — � � . - . . " " S „ 
/ .. Z :^  ‘ ‘― �� 
/ - ‘ 
by -
LEE PUI-WAH, JOSEPHINE , 
^ / . f l f ^ 
MBA PROJECT REPORT 
Presented to 
The Graduate School 
In Partial Fulfilment 
of the Requirement for the Degree of 
MASTER OF BUSESfESS ADMINISTRATION 
THREE-YEAR MBA PROGRAMME 
THE CHES[ESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG 
MAY 1997 
/ ^ ^ v 
/ y 統 系 館 書 圖 \ 女 、 
p f 0 6 FEB W ) i 
H / J 
% X _腳『丫 A f / 
^& !^BRARY SYSTEMyk^  
^ ^ S K 
APPROVAL 
Name : Lee Pui-Wah, Josephine 
Degree : Master ofBusiness Administration 
Title of project : Disclosure Standards of Chinese Companies : 
A Comparative Study of Companies with Both 
H and A Shares Listings 
^ T ^ A ^ I ^ 2H/\opo� 
(Name of Supervisor) 
Date Approved : " ^ ¾ ^ ^ ! ^ 7 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
A major development of Chinese state-owned enterprises reform, which began 
in 1978, was the introduction of the stock markets and reform of state-owned 
enterprises into joint stock limited companies. By the end of 1996, there are 13 
companies which have issued both H Shares to non-Chinese national investors and A 
Shares to Chinese nationals. 
These companies have been criticised for their lack of appreciation for the role 
of disclosure in corporate governance. This paper suggests that dually listed A and H 
Share companies are in fact subject to complicated, and at times conflicting, 
regulatory requirements in Hong Kong and China. China's approach to listed 
companies is close monitoring and heavy intervention. Dually listed A and H Shares 
have also come a long way improving their disclosure practice. 
This paper argues that on top of written rules and regulations, speculative 
nature of the A Share market, cultural influence and the lack of attention to the 
"software" of enterprise reform create barriers to improving the disclosure standards 
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• R O D U C T I O N 
Established as a socialist country, China operated a planned economy for 30 
years since 1949. Production and development targets were set by government 
agencies. Since 1978，the country has opened its door to foreign investment and 
undertaken domestic economic reform. The reform is considered as an attempt by the 
Communist Party to justify its rule after ten years of social unrest. Economic policies 
since 1978 have emphasised the utilisation of market mechanisms in the development 
of the Chinese economy. 
China's GNP has grown at an average of 11.8 percent from 1991 to 1995. 
Such rapid growth, however, has inevitably led to an overheated economy. Industrial 
output, in particular, has not been matched by commensurate growth in capital 
markets. This has left China with a massive savings pool, officially estimated at 
approximately RMBl,458 billion in 1993^ The huge pool of domestic saving calls 
for a more efficient utilisation mechanism. For the industrial sector, there is a huge 
need for capital. The shareholding system facilitates the flow of capital from savers to 
enterprises and provides incentives to alleviate agency cost in a planned economy. 
1 Source : Bloomberg 
2 
The introduction of a shareholding system in China in 1992 was probably the 
most dramatic step towards the realisation of enterprise reform and China's transition 
to a market-oriented economic system. With the support and encouragement from the 
government, more and more Chinese enterprises have chosen to meet their enormous 
funding needs by issuing shares in the form of A Shares, B Shares, H Shares or N 
Shares. 
However, international institutional investors have become much more 
sceptical towards Chinese enterprises in the past two years. Such attitude is evidenced 
in a survey that Hong Kong Economic Times conducted in 1995 with 13 fund 
management companies (Appendix I). Scepticism has stemmed from disappointing 
performance (both financial and share price), volatility, liquidity problem, and among 
others, the lack of transparency and investor protection. Chinese enterprises, 
historically state-owned enterprises，rarely had previous exposure to the financial 
world and its "rule of the game". They may not be aware of the importance of 
information disclosure in providing after-market support to their stocks. To some, 
fulfilling the minimum statutory requirement is sufficient. Little attention is given to 
the quality of information disclosed. 
Individual shareholders are rarely involved in the daily operations of their 
companies. Geographical barrier and policy swings, typical of emerging economies 
such as China, impose additional barriers to overseas investors trying to keep 
informed about their investments. Management plays an important role in deciding 
the strategy and practice of company disclosure. 
Having said that, the Chinese equity market is relatively "young" when 
compared with other stock markets in Asia, not to mention those in developed 
3 
countries. The regulatory framework is yet to be refined. Even in Hong Kong where 
the rules and regulations are better defined, there are constant amendments. Dually 
listed Chinese state owned enterprises face further challenges because ofthe different 
disclosure requirements in the markets where they are listed. 
Purpose of Studv 
This paper attempts to evaluate the differences in disclosure requirements in 
China and Hong Kong through a comparative study of companies that have issued 
both A Shares and H Shares. A Shares are Renminbi-denominated ordinary shares 
which are offered to local Chinese citizens only. H Shares, on the contrary, are 
overseas listed foreign shares traded in Hong Kong dollars. China is an emerging 
market, less developed than Hong Kong. In addition. Hong Kong is the most popular 
overseas stock market for Chinese state-owned enterprises to obtain a listing. 
Specifically, the paper examines the following areas : 
1. the development of state owned enterprise re-structuring in the 1990s and 
the market profile of A Shares and H Shares; 
2. a review of existing theories related to enhancing disclosure standards by 
means of self-regulation and governmental control; 
3. a comparison of the present reporting regulations applicable to H and A 
Shares; and 
4. an analysis of the disclosure standard by dually listed companies and 






An exploratory approach is adopted for this paper to increase familiarity with ！ 
the problem. Literature search is used firstly to develop ideas on the development of 
state owned enterprise re-structuring and the profile of the A Share and H Share 
markets. Published materials, such as existing rules and regulations, magazines, 
journals, newspaper clippings, materials of international seminar and statistics are 
used. 
A Shares and H Shares reporting regulations are compared to reveal their 
differences in practice. The two class of shares rank pari passu in terms of voting 
right. By the end of 1996, there were 23 H Share companies on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong Limited (HKSE) and 13 of them also listed on either the Shanghai 
Securities Exchange (SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SSE). 
Furthermore, unstructured interviews were conducted to tap the knowledge 
and experience of those familiar with the operation of A Shares ^nd H Shares. The 
aim is to obtain proactive ideas and useful insights. Company representatives, stock 
analysts, legal professionals and issuers were interviewed. The questions were 
unstructured and open-ended. 
I 
5 
Time Horizon Covered in the Paper 
The A Share market is under development; and therefore, regulations are being 
amended and new ones being introduced all the time. In this research, most recent 
information up to December 1996 is analysed. 
Assumption 
China's government policy is relatively unstable. Many studies and forecast 
of China became invalid and outdated because of swings in policies caused by 
changeover of policy makers. To be prudent, the analysis and conclusions are valid 
while assuming the present policies of the Chinese authority will not be changed. 
General Problems of Studies on China 
There are some general research methodology problems for studies on China. 
Firstly, the Chinese legal system governing securities are relatively recent. Their 
interpretation and enforcement involve significant uncertainty. Secondly, it should be 





CHINESE SHAREHOLDmG REFORM AND OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter will review policy changes that have transformed China's state 
owned enterprises into joint stock limited companies. It is hopeful that the discussion 
will help us appreciate the development of A and H Share companies, as well as throw 
light on the issues that these companies face in maintaining disclosure standards. It 
will be shown that difficulties arise partly because of the disparities in requirements 
and the fast pace at which they are changed. At the same time，there exists a 
relationship between culture and disclosure. 
Chinese Legal System 
China began to develop a modem legal system since 1979 as part of its open-
door policy and reform. On 29 December 1993, the National People's Congress 
promulgated the Company Law, which became effective on 1 July 1994. In August 
1994, pursuant to the Company Law, the State Council issued the "Special 
Regulations on Listing Overseas" to regulate joint stock limited companies that offer 
and list their shares overseas. The Company Law provides the core of the legal 
I 
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framework governing the corporate behaviour of companies. Because these laws are 
relatively recent, their interpretation and enforcement involve significant uncertainty. 
Currently, the primary source of A and/ or H Share shareholder rights and 
protection are the articles of association, the Chinese Company Law and, upon listing 
on HKSE, the Securities (Disclosure ofInterests) Ordinance, the Hong Kong Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases, the Protection of Investors 
Ordinance, the Hong Kong Listing Rules (Chapter 19 in particular) which, among 
other things, impose certain standards of conduct and disclosure of issuers. There has 
not, however, been any significant experience in the enforcement by H Share and A 
Share shareholders of their rights under these rules and regulations. 
The legal framework which Chinese joint stock limited companies are subject 
to and the mechanisms for enforcement of rights are materially different from those of 
Hong Kong. In China, liabilities arising from fiduciary duties that directors owe their 
companies and shareholders are not clearly defined. Furthermore, even holders of H 
Shares will be required to resolve any disputes through submission to the Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Centre or the China International Economic Trade 
Arbitration Commission for arbitration. 
The difficulties in enforcement weaken shareholders' role in monitoring the 
performance of the management, who may not be motivated to maintain high 
standards of corporate governance because there is little threat of being prosecuted or 
sanctioned. 
Hong Kong Stock Market - H Shares Profile 
I 
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On 19 June 1993, Hong Kong Securities and Future Commission (SFC), 
China Securities Regulations Commission (CSRC), HKSE, SHSE and SSE signed the 
Memorandum of Regulatory Co-operation to pave way for the issue of H Shares. In 
July 1993，Tsingtao Brewery became the first PRC company to directly enter the 
Hong 
Kong market via offering H Shares. As of31 December 1996，there are a total of 23 
2 
them，with a total market capitalisation of HK$31,520,282,530 . 
In terms of regulatory regime, there are SFC and HKSE. Hong Kong 
registered companies are also under their supervision. Reporting to the Financial 
Secretary, SFC is responsible for investigating violations against the Securities 
Ordinance, which was promulgated following the Hang Seng Index crash in 1973. 
Issuers are also governed by HKSE's Listing Rules, although there is no civil or 
criminal liability arising from non-compliance of those rules. Repeated contravention 
may result in the suspension or delisting of an issuer. The Listing Rules are regularly 
reviewed by HKSE in consultation with practitioners. 
< 
Chinese Stock Market - A Shares Profile 
There are 287 A Share companies listed on SHSE and 227 on SSE^ Thirteen 
of these companies are dually listed in Hong Kong: 
2 Source : Hong Kong Economic Joumal (2 January 1997):15 
3 Source : Bloomberg 
I 
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Closing price on 31 
December 1996 
Ticker H Shares A Shares 
(HK$) (RMB) 
1. Northeast Electrical Transmission and Transformation 1.35 6.97 
Machinery Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 
2. Tsingtao Brewery Co. Ltd. 2.93 6.20 
3. Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. 1.90 5.12 
4. Kumming Machine Tool Co. Ltd 
5. Guangzhou Shipyard International Co. Ltd. 1.96 5.20 
6. Maanshan Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. 1.66 3.60 
7. Shanghai Petrochemical Co. Ltd. 2.35 6.10 
8. Jilin Chemical Industrial Co. Ltd. f ^ 12.924 
9. Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co. Ltd. YM 4 ^ 
10. Tianjin Baohai Chemical Industry (Group) Co. Ltd. 0 ^ 4.16 
11. Dongfang Electrical Machinery Co. Ltd. 2J0 6.38 
12. Luoyang Glass Co. Ltd. 2.375 5 ^ 
13. Shanghai Hai Xing Shipping Co. Ltd. ^ ^ 
In the early days of the A Share market, there was a severe shortage of supply, 
resulting in a steady escalation of A Share prices. The A Share index on SHSE has 
increased eight fold and SSE almost three fold in three years time from 1990 to 1993 .^ 
It has created a misperception among investors that prices could only go up and retum 
was guaranteed. This kind of mentality shows a significant difference in investor's 
4 "Share Issuing, Trading and Listing", The Capital Guide to China's Securities Markets (1994):50 
I 
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expectation ofpublic companies in the A Share and H Share market. When shares are 
purchased without regard to market fundamentals because it seems that any issue 
would increase in price, investors become indifferent to the differences between 
companies. The huge price differential between A and H Shares of a company also 
illustrates the speculative nature of the A Share market. While there are regulations 
governing information disclosure in China, the pressure coming from Chinese 
domestic investors is relatively low when compared with that from overseas. 
To illustrate the difference in market expectation and issuers' awareness for 
adequate disclosure, a classic example was Tsingtao Brewery's decision not to 
announce interim results in 1993. Although the company's shares were very popular 
at that time, the decision reflected badly on the company's image and the management 
standard of H Share issuers. Interim reporting is considered "best practice" in Hong 
Kong to protect investors. 
China has a more complicated regulatory regime than Hong Kong. In October 
1992, the Chinese government set up a two-tier securities monitoring system, which 
aimed at strengthening macro-management control of stock markets. The first tier is ^ 
I: 
the State Council Securities Committee ("SCSC"). This committee would oversee ; 
i 
I 
policy-making, such as deciding how many new issues should be made on the market 
or drafting new securities laws. The second tier is CSRC, which is under the 
guidance, supervision, inspection and administration of SCSC. Both organisations 
have taken over most of the securities-related responsibilities ofthe People's Bank of 
China through setting up oflocal offices in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
The disclosure provisions are contained in the Detailed Implementing Rules 
on the Disclosure of Information by Companies making Public Offering of Shares (for 
i 
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Trial Implementation) and two subsidiary sets of mles which relate specifically to 
prospectuses and annual accounts. Under these measures, CSRC is responsible for 
supervising the disclosure of information by companies which have offered shares to 
the public. These measures set out the form and content of the prospectuses, interim 
reports, and announcements of material transactions of companies which have offered 
shares to the public. 
The A Share market experienced severe downturns in 1994. While the 
declines could be interpreted as a natural market realignment to compensate for 
increased supply and decreased demand in shares, the Chinese government has 
announced a number of administrative measures to intervene in the market. In the 
longer term, if China wishes to restore investors' confidence, CSRC must address the 







THEORIES RELATED TO STOCK MARKET REGULATION 
Given the diversity of modem corporate system, there are calls for greater 
minority shareholder protection measures, such as better disclosure. Demand for 
better disclosure has come from the protagonists of the agency theory, who suggest 
directors, because of their position, command a great deal of power under very limited 
control that can be exercised over them by their shareholders. 
Some companies just care to fulfil minimum statutory requirements. Others 
disclose on a voluntary basis to enhance their investor relations communications. One 
of the questions is how to improve the standard of practice. There are two main 
streams of thought in this respect: 
1. promotion of self-regulation; and | 
2. government intervention by legislation. 
The issue of stock market regulation is rarely dealt with in conventional text 
books, and there has been no systematic studies in this area. In fact, many stock 
markets in the industrialised world have traditionally adopted a self-regulated 
approach. Government intervention has been kept low, especially in the West. For 
example, US capital market has evolved and flourished for over 150 years without 
i 
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formal governmental regulation, before the US Exchange Act was passed in 1934 to 
formalise the regulation of the stock market. 
However, in a socialist country like China, a major characteristic is that the 
State assumes a tight rein on the economy. The macro-economic measures announced 
in 1994 illustrate the Chinese government's tendency to adopt a “go and halt" 
approach while the professed policy is to allow the market to regulate itself. It must 
be noted that China's securities market is developing under the prerequisites ofpublic 
ownership and adherence to socialist orientation. If we can compare reforming state 
owned enterprises into joint stock limited companies to selling off family silver, the 
arrangement is necessary but barely politically acceptable. To do so without 
maintaining a close watch on the state asset would be unacceptable. Heavy 
;l 
li I, 
government control was evident in the securities market's history in the past decade. | 
i 
This is quite different from the Westem practice of self-regulation. [ 
|l 
At present, the responsibility of monitoring the securities market lies largely 丨 
丨' 
with official bodies in China. It has been pointed out that the mechanism and culture 
for self-regulation has not yet been fully developed^ The experimental nature ofthe , 
; i 
securities markets has been demonstrated by the level of state intervention. Behind ： 
i 
the apparent progress, China's experiment with stocks requires flirther market 
maturation, comprehensive legislation, efficient monitoring, co-operation between 
regulatory bodies, market practitioners and issuers. 
There are two main streams of theory explaining the reasons why stock market 
regulation is necessary : the market failure theory and public choice theory. 
5 "Certain Issues Related to Securities Law Legislation", Zhenquan Shichang Juanga Tan (1994):42 
M 
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Market Failure Theory 
The market failure theory is basically a functional approach which emphasises 
that the function of the regulation is to cure the failure of the market under some 
specific situations. It is the rationale for regulation. The sources of market failure 
include differentiation of market power and asymmetric information. 
Differentiated market power refers to the different power of market 
participants in transaction dealing especially in terms of pricing. In the case where a 
market participant with a relatively bigger size than its competitors or trading : 
i 
counterparts, it can realise excess profits by manipulating price which deviates from 
the value that would prevail under the perfect competitive market conditions. So a 
pure laissez-faire regulatory policy in an imperfect market cannot maintain faimess. 
Regulation itself is public good to ensure a fair and orderly market. It can : 
1. provide a fair environment and prevent any manipulation on price and 
trading volume of the stock, abuse of power and information by insiders; 
2. minimise the operational costs of a security market by maintaining order in 
the intermediary services, such as brokerage commission; 
3. enhance market efficiency vis-a-vis pricing discovery, which refers to the 
process in which the market can find out a transaction price approximating 
to an equilibrium price. The regulatory bodies shall build various 
measures to facilitate the price discovery process. 
However, such public-type services are under-supplied in a purely free market and a 
public regulatory body providing such services is necessary. 
15 
Asymmetric information is created when not all market participants own the 
same information. Insiders having more information than the public can yield 
abnormal profit. Investors at informational disadvantage become more reluctant to 
participate in the market and a thinner and deteriorating market would result. 
Regulation is therefore required to eliminate informational asymmetries, by imposing 
more trading restrictions and improving the information dissemination system. 
Therefore, law-makers are called upon to minimise market failure and enhance 
public investment interests through regulations. , 
I 
I 
Public Choice Theorv 
The public choice theory looks at the subject in a different light. It is 
interested in who affects regulation making and how it is affected. The theory states 
that regulations are the outcome of political process in which various interested 
parties, or the principals, try to maximise their vested interests. Legislators are 
viewed as agents for their principals who include various forces such as the stock 
exchange, public investors, stock brokers, listed companies, agencies of the 
governments, etc.. 
Although the behaviour of the agents are conditioned by public interests and 
expectation, the opinion of the principals also plays a part in the policy formulation 
process. Therefore, regulations are not necessarily made for enhancing public 
interests but it is only a compromised agreement among different groups. Different 
from the market failure theory, the public choice theory stresses the behavioural 
aspect instead of normative values. 
16 
In the following chapter, the existing disclosure requirements for dually listed 
H and A Shares will be compared with reference to their function in promoting 
informational efficiency in the market. Compliance standards with respect to 
regulations to promote operational efficiency and price discovery will not be 







Companies dually listed in Hong Kong and China are governed by regulations 
and statues applicable in the respective jurisdictions. For example, their accounts in 
I 
I 
China must be prepared according to PRC accounting standards. At the same time, ; 
because of Hong Kong listing requirements information disclosed to overseas 
shareholders cannot be withheld in Hong Kong and these numbers are also published 
in the territory. 
Dually listed companies are required to keep HKSE, SHSE or SSE, CSRC and 
their shareholders informed, as soon as reasonably practicable, of all price sensitive 
information relating to the issuers and their subsidiaries. Such information is kept 
strictly confidential until a formal announcement is made. The overriding principle is 
that price sensitive information should be announced immediately after it is the 
subject of a decision and should not be released by an issuer in such a way as to place 
somebody in a privileged position. This chapter discusses the continuing obligations 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Information Disclosure Related to Takeover and Merger 
The basic objective oftakeover regulations is to protect minority shareholders 
when the control of their company changes, and ensure that they have an opportunity 
ofreceiving fUll information and a fair price for their holdings. In China, takeover is 
defined as a transaction where an entity acquires 25 percent or above of the voting 
rights of a listed companies. There are two sub-groups: 
1. partial acquisition 二 below 100 percent; 
2. complete acquisition = 100 percent. 
When an entity acquires more than 25 percent of a company's issued share 
capital, it has to notify all the other shareholders and make a general offer to purchase 
all the shares in the same class. The takeover becomes effective when 50 percent of 
independent shareholders of the target company, who are not related to the acquiring 
company, agree to the takeover. 
Agreements relating to a takeover and merger must be sent to supervisory 
authorities for approval three days before they are made public. Once the negotiation 
for takeover starts, the shares of the target company shall be suspended from trading. 
From the day on which the agreement is signed until the transaction is completed, the 
target company may not issue any securities and sign any contract outside the normal 
business scope. 
The target company and the acquiring company shall issue information 
memorandum relating to this matter within 20 days of the takeover agreement being 
made to the public. For the company proposing takeover, the memorandum shall 
include: 
21 
1. particulars of shareholders with controlling interests; 
2. financial statements for the past three years; 
3. a time table for takeover; 
4. the price being offered for the shares and manner of payment; 
5. a description of material contracts affecting the company; and 
6. the future plans. 
For the target company, the information memorandum includes: 
1. comments for the directors; 
2. particulars of the shares owned by the directors; 
3. a report of the financial conditions for the past three years; 
4. existing financial obligations; and 
5. a description of materials contracts. 
In Hong Kong, takeover activities are governed by the Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers. The code is considered a product of consensus regarding standards of 
commercial conduct and behaviour considered acceptable in takeover and merger 
transactions in Hong Kong?. The purpose is to provide guidelines and there is no 
enforcement power. But non-compliance amounts to a breach of Listing Agreement. 
The general principles are : 
1. all shareholders are to be treated even-handedly, and all shareholders of the 
same class are to be treated similarly; 
7 "Amalgamations, Reconstructions, and Takeovers", Hong Kong Company Law. (1994):326 
22 
shareholders should be given sufficient information, advice, and time to 
reach an informed decision. No relevant information should be withheld 
or made available in a discriminative manner; 
2. full and prompt disclosure of all relevant information and precaution to 
avoid the creation or continuance of a false market; and 
3. all parties concerned are required to co-operate with the Takeover and 
Merger Panel comprising members of SFC, HKSE and merchant banks. 
The administration ofthe code is delegated to SFC. There are two situations 
when a mandatory general offer has to be made to all the shareholders: 
1. any person or a group of persons acting in concert acquires shares which 
carry 35 percent or more of the voting rights ofa company; 
2. more of the voting rights of a company or any person or persons acting in 
concert hold not less than 35 percent but not more than 50 percent ofthe 
voting rights and they acquire an additional five percent of the voting 
rights in any period of 12 months. 




The rules are very similar in the two markets but the time limit is looser in 
Hong Kong. 
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Dually listed companies have to present their results announcement drafts to 
either SHSE or SSE (depends on their listing) 10 days before the publishing date and 
within 10 days of receiving such drafts, SHSE or SSE must issue its opinion which 
will be incorporated into the statement. 
Similarly, HKSE requires H Share companies submit drafts for vetting and 
ensure that such drafts are not issued until HKSE has confirmed no further comments 
in respect of such drafts. No submission deadline is specified. 
Disclosure ofDirectors' and Substantial Shareholders' Interests 
In Hong Kong, the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance imposes 
obligations on all listed companies to notify HKSE and SFC the following related 
parties' interests in the company: 
1. interests and any change of interests disclosed by its directors, chief 
executives, substantial shareholders and their families and companies they 
control; 
2. a person who acquires or ceases to have an interest of 10 percent or more 
ofa listed company must notify the company and HKSE within five days. 
In China, these rules are not available although some principles are laid out 




Depth and Breadth ofTnformation 
The information disclosure requirement is in general quite similar in both 
jurisdictions. Hong Kong seems to be more clear in its requirements. For example, 
with the exception of a few Hong Kong statutes which apply to overseas companies 
listed on HKSE, listed companies are basically governed by the Listing Agreement 
and Listing Rules. In China, requirements are equally numerous and tend to be very 
restrictive. For example, there are instructions on the physical annual report layout as 
well. This is contrary to popular belief that A Shares demand less disclosure. This 
means companies with dual listing in Hong Kong and China give out more 
information at their annual and interim results than do normal listed companies in 
Hong Kongl To illustrate this point, Shanghai Petrochemical won the first runner-up 
for best disclosure in Money Asia 1996's contest (new listings and H Shares group). 
However, regulations in China tend to be fragmented. There is a clear power 
struggle going on between the People's Bank of China, CSRC and regional authorities 
for control and development and regulation of the securities markets in China^. This 
8 Hong Kong Economic Joumal (2 November 1997) 
9 China Capital Market (1993):110 
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has led to a certain amount of duplication and inefficiency in the use of China's scarce 
regulatory resources. 
The Quality ofTnformation 
The quality of information disclosed is equally important. Besides directors' 
fiduciary duty to ensure no misrepresentation or omission of information, the quality 
assurance mechanism for dually listed Chinese state enterprises are twofold. 
Firstly, a sponsor of H Share issues must remain financial adviser to their 
issuers for three years after the offering. Experienced with local regulations and 
market practice, the sponsor can help maintain the quality of information. Shanghai 
Petrochemical and Maanshan Iron & Steel continued to appoint a merchant bank as 
their financial advisers and actively consult their advisers on major corporate 
governance issues even after the three-year period. Secondly, the annual accounts 
must be audited by a practising independent auditor ofgood standing. 
A big problem facing dually listed state owned enterprises is the fact that the 
ground rules are often shifting. A classic example of this was the implementation of 
value added tax (VAT) in 1994. Controversy arose when companies adopted different 
accounting policies to present the effect in their 1994 annual results report. Shanghai 
Petrochemical and Yizheng Chemical belong to very similar industry and use the 
same auditor. However, they took different approach in their treatment of the effect 
arising from VAT. The key point is not that either accounting treatment is right or 
wrong, but that in a rapidly changing environment differing treatments can cause 
significant changes to the bottom line. 
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Difficulties that Issuers Confront 
Cultural Influence 
Ideological differences also explain why the management of dually listed 
Chinese issuers often attracts criticism from overseas investors. Under the influence 
ofChinese culture which honours respect for authority, regulations in China are often 
dictated by official agencies and bodies. On the contrary, securities legislation in 
Hong Kong resembles more closely to a process of reaching consensus of opinion 
among industry practitioners. There is often a period of public consultation before a 
regulation or law is adopted. 
The respect for authority has also led to another outcome. Few Chinese 
participates in either determining rules or censuring their enforcement by the 
government. As a result, Mainland Chinese individuals and enterprises tend to lack 
the confidence and faith in the rule of law. They may have a greater propensity than 
their Westem counterparts to take regulations lightly or on the surface. This 
assumption is not without grounds considering the variation in disclosure standard 
practised by H Share and A Share companies. 
Moreover, according to research findings^^, Chinese organisations tend to 
avoid formal structure and rules. Formal structure and rules are seen by leaders as 
obstacles to building and exercising their power. In many ways, the country itself is 
still living under heavy influence of its leaders. The notion and respect for law in 
China is not as deeply rooted as it is in Westem countries. Having operated in a 
society which promoted collectivism and conformity, when faced with a new rule of 
10 Organisation Behaviour : Southeast Asia Perspective. (1992):118 
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games for listed companies, Chinese state-owned enterprises have a hard time 
balancing their own mind-set and the expectation of institutional investors in the H 
Share market. 
Lack ofMotivation 
There is an ideological dilemma inherent to the introduction of a capital 
market in China. Many conservative Chinese leaders consider the shareholding 
reform is at odds with the basic tenet of public ownership. The argument in favour of 
issuance ofequity is that a stock market, if properly supervised, is an effective way of 
tuming private savings into capital investment. The primary purpose of state 
enterprise reform is not privatisation, making management accountable to private 
shareholders. For instance, more than 50 percent of the ownership must be retained 
by the State. The debate over this ideological dilemma has never ceased to bother 
Chinese leaders from the outset, and results in their taking a tentative attitude towards 
the development of the stock markets. 
Conservative directors and managers tend to adopt a “wait and see" attitude 
when new rules and regulations are announced. For example, HKSE announced in 
1996 a review of H Share companies' annual report and accounts. It noticed much 
discrepancy among H Shares in the amount of information covered in "management 
discussion and analysis". Listed companies on HKSE are required to include a 
"management discussion and analysis" in their annual report since September 1994. 
HKSE attributed this observation to management conservatism. 
Lack ofEducation and Standards 
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Part ofthe problem stems from the lack of education, hence awareness, about 
corporate governance practices. The experiment with shareholding reform in China 
started five years ago. To many company management, as well as financial 
intermediaries, they are still grouping their way in the equity markets. More general 
information and education programmes are needed to explain the true nature of 
securities. 
For example, there is no national accreditation programme for financial 
intermediaries in China. While company secretary plays an important role in a 
company's internal governance and external communications, there is no systematic 
procedure to qualify their professional knowledge. 
The Importance ofTnformation in a Speculative Market 
As it has been pointed out in Chapter III that the notion of unlimited retum in 
the A Share market has fostered an indifference among investors to the fundamental 
differences between listed companies. Nowadays in China, people's concept of 
investing in shares is still influenced by the stock market legacy during the republican 
period (1911 - 1949). The golden era of the Shanghai stock exchange was between 
1939 and 1945 when the Japanese occupied the city. Trading was particularly 
vigorous before the Japanese surrendered as the market was flooded with much price-
sensitive political news. The government manifestly adopted a laissez-faire policy. 
Investors were best examples of speculators who reaped millions of dollars from the 
market and lost them all ovemight. 
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The current A Share market is equally dominated by the political scene in 
China. Although all stock markets in the world are affected by rumours ofthe major 
political and economic issues, the A Share market is far more sensitive. This 
characteristic renders the subject of information efficiency more complicated. The 
fundamental information ofan issuer is not correlated with the price performance and 
is not regarded important. 
In fact, speculative sentiment also prevails among retail investors in Hong 
Kong. They rely heavily on second-hand information, such as media investment 
recommendation. Few will undertake detail fundamental analysis or evaluate 
corporate governance standards when they buy shares. 
. Nature ofReform 
To protect investors' legal rights and prevent fraudulent activities, an effective 
measure is to maintain adequate disclosure. So far, the primary focus of Chinese 
enterprise reform has been on structural change, such as how ownership is distributed 
in modem corporations. In fact, on-going information disclosure is also an important 
element of a modem corporation. 
Requirements specified in existing Chinese Company Law is far from 
comprehensive. The long-awaited Securities Law, expected to be passed in 1997 





Reforming Chinese state-owned enterprises into joint stock limited company 
not only satisfies the capital needs of these companies but also give overseas investors 
access to China's economic growth. This is a significant step that China has taken 
and the road has not been easy. Dually listed companies have to spend substantial 
management time to leam the rules and practices of each market after they go public. 
One of the key issues is winning the goodwill of their investors by keeping them 
informed. 
Probably because H Shares are so popular among overseas investors that they 
become the focus of much attention. Investors naturally sets higher expectation on 
them. However, state-owned enterprises have operated in the past decade under 
central planning. Those, which have gone public, are undergoing a transition, trying 
to familiarise and adapt to the practices of the stock markets in Hong Kong and China. 
Despite of criticisms of sub-standard reporting, progress that Chinese listed 
companies have made in information disclosure should not be cancelled out 
simplistically. For the year ending 31 December 1995, all 13 dually listed A and H 
Share companies submitted annual results announcement punctually. HKSE 
announced in 1996 a review of H Share companies' annual report and accounts. In 
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terms of the amount of information and consistency, HKSE considered the 1995 
annual reports have improved a lot when compared with the 1993's. Tianjin Baohai 
has made an unprecedented public announcement in February 1997 to wam Hong 
Kong investors about an anticipated decline in profits in the financial year 1996. 
Anyone can point to the experience of Westem countries as the model for 
China to modernise its joint stock limited. However, it should be remembered that 
China is continuously adjusting its pace and direction of economic reform. At 
present, the purpose ofthe stock market is definitely not to privatise state companies, 
but to introduce new capital and make state enterprises more efficient. 
Adequate levels of disclosure are integral to the efficient operation of a 
securities market. It is essential that clear standards are drafted and an environment is 
established that will facilitate the adherence to the stipulated requirements. In other 
words, the relevant regulatory officials need to push the onus of disclosure 
responsibility onto the companies, and punish companies for non-compliance. The 
objective should be to create a market that conforms with international standards of 
disclosure. The companies that failed to comply with CSRC requirements were 
mainly A Share issuers, not dually listed A and H Share companies. 
One ofthe priorities of a successful securities market is to attract institutional 
investors who require high levels of disclosure to protect their investments. At the 
current market capitalisation of SHSE and SSE, China may want maintain certain 
market entry barriers to foreign institutional investors, who command great financial 
strength; hence the ability to manipulate prices. It will take some time before China 
develops a significant domestic institutional investment base. 
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There are ways to structure the legal and regulatory framework of a stock 
market, and some of them may be compatible with a socialist economy, assuming 
always that there is a fundamental desire to move towards market economy. It is 
equally important for directors in state-owned enterprises to change their mindset and 
leam to be accountable to investors. 
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APPENDIX III 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Abstain 
disagree agree 
Q1 15.4% 77% 7.7% - - -
Q2 7.7% 69.2% 23.1% - - -
Q3 7.7% 15.4% 69.2% - - 7.7% 
Q4 30.8% 46.1% 23.1% - - -
Q5 15.4% 38.5% 38.5% 7.7% - -
Q6 30.8% 30.8% 23.1% 7.7% - 7.7% 
Q 7 7.7% - 46.1% 15.4% 7.7% 23.1% 
Q1 State-owned enterprises are transparent enough. 
Q2 The management of state-owned enterprises announces the financial situation 
and operational environment of their companies honestly. 
Q3 State-owned enterprises were properly informed of policy changes. 
Q4 State-owned enterprises have a clear understanding of what to disclose to 
investors. 
Q5 The management of state-owned enterprises is capable of coping with policy 
change. 
Q6 Investors have proper channels to clarify "heard on the street" type ofnews 
related to policies. 
Q7 State-owned enterprises are less likely to report insider trading than Hong 
Kong companies. 




2 Profit (and loss) on before taxation and extraordinary items, including the 
share ofprofit (or loss) ofassociated companies, with separate disclosure of 
any items included therein which are exceptional because ofsize and 
incidence. 
3 Taxation on profits derived from Hong Kong and overseas, if any, in each case 
indicating the basis ofcomputation with separate disclosure ofthe taxation on 
the share of associated companies' profits. 
4 Profit (or loss) attributable to minority interests. 
5 Profit (or loss) attributable to shareholders before extraordinary items. 
6 Extraordinary items (net of taxation). 
7 Profit (or loss) attributable to shareholders. 
8 Rates of dividends paid or proposed on each class of shares (with particulars 
ofeach such class) and amounts absorbed thereby (or an appropriate negative 
statement). 
9 Transfer to and from reserves. 
10 Earnings per share calculated on the basis of profits before extraordinary 
items. 
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11 Comparative figures ofthe matters specified in (1) to (10) inclusive for the 
corresponding previous period. 
12 Subject to sub paragraph (11.2) below, a statement as at the end ofthe relevant 
period showing the following: 
12.1.1 the interest of each directors and chief executive in the equity 
or debt securities of the company or any associated corporation 
(within the meaning ofthe Securities (Disclosure ofInterests) 
Ordinance; and 
12.1.2 the details ofany rights to subscribe for equity or debt 
securities ofthe company granted to any director or chief 
executive or to the spouse or infant children ofany such 
director or chiefexecutive and of the exercise of such rights as 
recorded in the register required to be kept under section 29 of 
the Securities (Disclosure ofInterests) Ordinance, or ifthere is 
no such interest or no such rights have been granted or 
exercised a statement of that fact. 
12.2 The statement in sub-paragraph (12.1) above must specify the company 
which securities are held, the class to which those securities belong and 
the number ofsecurities held but need not disclose the interest ofa 
director in the equity securities of the company or any ofits 
subsidiaries if such interest is held solely in a non-beneficial capacity 
and for the purpose ofholding the requisite qualifying shares; or such 
interest is held solely for the purpose of ensuring that the relevant 
subsidiary has more than one member and that the holding ofthe 
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shares is subject to a valid and legally enforceable declaration oftmst 
in favour of the parent company of that subsidiary. 
12.3 A statement as at the end of the relevant period showing the interest of 
every person, other than a director or chief executive, in the equity 
securities ofthe company as recorded in the register required to be kept 
under section 16(1) ofthe Securities (Disclosure ofInterests) 
Ordinance and the amount of such interest, or if there is no such 
interest recorded in the register, statement ofthat fact. 
13 An explanatory statement relating to the activities of the group and profit (or 
loss) during the relevant period, which must include any significant 
information enabling investors to make an informed assessment ofthe trend of 
the activities and profit (or loss) of the group, together with an indication of 
any special factor which has influenced those activities and the profit (or loss) 
during the period in question, enabling a comparison to be made with the 
corresponding period ofthe preceding financial year and referring to the 
prospects ofthe group in the current period. 
14 Any supplementary information which in the directors' opinion is necessary 
for a reasonable appreciation of the results for the six-month period. 
15 Particulars of any purchase, sale or redemption by the company or any of its 
subsidiaries ofits listed securities or an appropriate negative statement. 
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APPENDIX III 
1 The principal activities (including their significant changes) ofthe company 
and its subsidiaries during the year. 
2 The financial statements for the year and the amount of dividends 
recommended by the directors to be paid to the members ofthe company. 
3 The amount proposed by directors to be transferred to reserves and the total 
amount available. 
4 The total amount of charitable or other donations made by the company and its 
subsidiaries exceeding HK$1,000 during the year. 
5 ifthe company has issued any shares or debentures during the financial year, 
the reason for the issue, the class and number of shares or debentures issued, 
and the consideration received. 
6 Any significant changes in the fixed assets of the company and its subsidiaries 
during the year. 
7 The names and details of the directors of the company during the year and, if 
applicable, any retirement ofdirectors in accordance with the articles of 
association. 
8 The details ofthe directors' or a controlling shareholder's direct or indirect 
interests in any significant contract subsisting with the company, any ofits 
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subsidiaries, its holding company, or any of its fellow subsidiaries during the 
year. 
9 The details of any arrangement to which the company, or any of its 
subsidiaries, or its holding company, or any of its fellow subsidiaries was a 
party to enable any director to acquire shares in, or debentures of , the 
company or any other body corporate. 
10 The particulars of matters which are material for the members' appreciation of 
the state ofthe company's affairs which, in the directors' opinion, will not if 
disclosed, be harmful to the business of the company, or any ofits 
subsidiaries. 
11 Resolution for the reappointment of the auditors to be submitted at the next 
annual general meeting. 
12 The details ofthe classes and numbers of any convertible securities, options, 
warrant, or similar rights issued or granted by the company or its subsidiaries. 
13 Particulars of any redemption, purchase, or cancellation by the company or 
any ofits subsidiaries ofits redeemable securities and the amount ofsuch 
securities outstanding after any such redemption, purchase, or cancellation has 
been made. 
14 An explanation of the difference between trading results shown by the 
accounts for the period under review and published forecasts made by the 
company, if any. 
15 A statement by the directors as to the reasons for any significant departure 
from applicable standard accounting practices in Hong Kong. 
16 A statement of interest capitalised by the group during the year. 
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17 The details of properties held by the group which represents an amount in 
excess o f l 5 percent of the value of the company's net tangible assets or 
consolidated net tangible assets or eam an amount in excess o f l 5 per cent of 
the company's pre-tax operating profits or consolidated pre-tax operating 
profits. 
• 18 A statement of director's remuneration. 
19 A summary in the form of a comparative table, of the results and ofthe assets 
and liabilities ofthe group for the last five financial years. 
20 Details of pension scheme. 
21 Details ofmajor customers and suppliers and the contracts with them. 
22 Discussion and analysis of the group, s performance. 
23 A monthly breakdown ofpurchases of shares made during the financial year, 
specifying the number ofshares purchased per month, purchase price per 
share, or the highest and lowest price paid and the aggregate price paid and the 
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